Mailing address
One Brattle Square 503
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Mailbox 134
Cambridge, MA, 02138
Website
Matthew Fuhrmann
Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Contact:
Telephone: 617-495-8995
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: Matthew_Fuhrmann@ksg.harvard.edu
Website: http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~mfuhrma/
Experience
Matthew Fuhrmann is a joint research fellow with the Belfer Center's International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom. He received his Ph.D. (2008) from the department of political science at the University of Georgia and has earned a M.S. (2004) from the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. He will join the faculty at the department of political science at the University of South Carolina as an assistant professor in January 2009.
His general research interests are in the areas of international security, international law, and intrastate conflict. Much of his work focuses on the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. His dissertation, which is entitled "The Nuclear Marketplace and Grand Strategy," seeks to explain international trade in civilian nuclear technology. He has published or has forthcoming articles in the Journal of Peace Research, Foreign Policy Analysis, Problems of Post-Communism, and Disarmament Diplomacy.
Prior to joining the Belfer Center, he worked as a research associate with the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security. There, he conducted research on nonproliferation export control, border security, and strategic trade and authored reports on these topics for U.S. government agencies.
AP Photo
September 2008
"Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade"
Journal Article, Journal of Peace Research, issue 5, volume 45
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This study applies well-known arguments on the effect of conflict, alliances, and democracy on international trade to identify the determinants of dual-use trade. Dual-use commodities are those that can be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or in legitimate civilian applications. This article advances a theory suggesting that governments seeking to maximize the gains from dual-use trade will promote exports to countries where there are security guarantees and restrict exports to countries where security threats exist.
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March 14, 2008
"Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Ratification"
Working Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program and Xiaojun Li
Matthew Fuhrmann and co-author Xiaojun Li examine when and why states ratify regional nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties.
AP Photo
February 29, 2008
"Oil for Nukes — Mostly a Bad Idea"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"...In 1975, France signed an agreement with Iraq authorizing the export of a research reactor and highly enriched uranium. According to French officials at the time, their aim was to obtain a permanent and secure oil supply from a country that provided 20 percent of its oil.
It worked. But it also had tremendous consequences for international and regional security."
January 2008
"Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives"
Journal Article, Foreign Policy Analysis, issue 1, volume 4
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program and Bryan Early, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
The article explains why in September 1991, shortly after the attempted putsch against Gorbachev, George H.W. Bush launched the unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The PNIs were measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date The article argues that an explanation rooted in prospect theory and a focus on Bush as an individual decision-maker offers the most explanatory power.
